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NOTES
EVIDENCE- ADMISSIBILITY OF SILENCE
AFTER ARREST As IMPLIED ADMISSION
In a murder prosecution a deputy sheriff was permitted to
testify that two other deputies gave him a pistol and a whiskey
bottle, the deputies stating that these items were taken from the
defendant when he was arrested. The defendant was present
when the statement was made and apparently remained silent.
In overruling an objection to this evidence, the trial court held
that since the statement was made in the presence of the defend-
ant, it was not hearsay.' On appeal the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed and remanded. Held, the defendant's silence
while under arrest in response to statements made by a law en-
forcement officer is not admissible as an admission. State v.
Hayden, 243 La. 793, 147 So. 2d 392 (1962).
A party's relevant, nonprivileged, out-of-court statements
and conduct are generally admissible against him by virtue of an
exception to the hearsay rule for express and implied admis-
sions.2 It is well settled that evidence of silence of a defendant in
a criminal case in response to incriminating statements made in
his presence which, if false, would normally provoke a denial, is
admissible as an admission.8 Evidentiary weight apparently is
1. But see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962
Term -Evidence, 23 LA. L. REv. 406, 412 (1963), in connection with another
case: "With deference, it is submitted that the mere fact that an out of court
statement was made in the presence of an accused should not necessarily cause
it to be classified as non-hearsay or admissible as an admission. At times, be-
cause of its independent relevance, the fact that a statement was made in the
presence of an accused outside of court may be admissible as fact of utterance
rather than utterance of fact as for example to show that the accused was pos-
sessed of certain information."
2. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1048-1059 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]. Express admissions are those resulting from a person's statements
of fact; implied admissions result from his conduct. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 239
(1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. Admissions may be offered against
party litigants in a civil case or the defendant in a criminal case.
Although courts generally characterize admissions as an exception to the hear-
say rule, there is strong support for considering many implied admissions as non-
hearsay because of their non-assertive nature. MCCORMICK §§ 239, 246. For an
analysis of the hearsay rule and its treatment in Louisiana, see Comment, 14
LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
3. 4 WIGMORE § 1071. In general Professor Wigmore treats admissions by
silence in terms of "adoption" of the third person's statement. 2 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 405, at 153 (12th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as W a-
TON]; MCCORMICK, § 246, at 528.
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given only to the silence, and not the statement which is admit-
ted solely to give meaning to the response. 4
There is a division of authority whether evidence of a de-
fendant's silence after arrest is admissible." Many courts hold
the fact that the defendant was in custody alone renders his si-
lence inadmissible,6 finding a common belief that silence while
under arrest is most conducive to one's welfare whether guilty
or innocent and that an accused's silence may be attributed as
easily to this belief as to a consciousness of guilt.7 However, an
approximately equal number of courts hold that all of the sur-
rounding circumstances must be weighed to determine admissi-
bility, the circumstance of arrest being but one consideration.8
Silence as an admission is recognized in Louisiana;9 the
jurisprudence, however, has generally held the silence of an ac-
cused under arrest inadmissible.10 In the early case of State v.
4. See McCoRmiCK § 246, at 528-29; Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1235, 1236 (1932).
It seems unrealistic to expect members of a jury to draw this fine distinction;
they will naturally regard the statement as evidence of the facts stated.
5. 2 WHARTON § 410, at 165; 20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 574 (1939); Annots.,
115 A.L.R. 1505 (1938), 80 A.L.R. 1259 (1932).
6. MCCORMICK § 246, at 529.
7. 2 WHARToN § 410, at 166; Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1505 (1938).
8. McCoRMICK § 246, at 529.
One court has held that to admit evidence of a defendant's silence after arrest
would be a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Crabb v. State,
86 0kla. Crim. 323, 192 P.2d 1018 (1948) ; Towery v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 216,
163 Pac. 331 (1917). Contra, Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d
895 (1947). See Comment, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 593 (1959) for a discussion of
this aspect of the constitutional problem of self-incrimination.
9. State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 719, 194 So. 756, 759 (1940) : "We think,
therefore that the testimony, being a definite statement of a matter of fact, and
having been made in the presence and hearing of the defendants, was of such a
nature as to call for a reply or correction, and that the defendant, having failed
to make a reply or correct the statements of the deceased, such statements are
admissible as tending to show an acquiescence as to the truth of the statement.".
City of Shreveport v. Marx, 148 La. 31, 86 So. 602 (1920) ; State v. Munston, 35'
La. Ann. 888 (1883) ; State v. Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 842 (1883).
For civil cases involving this point, see Olivier v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
43 La. Ann. 804, 9 So. 431 (1891) ; Morton v. Rils, 5 La. 413 (1833) ; Dumisnil
v. Steinberg, 130 La. 135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930).
10. State v. Rini, 151 La. 163, 91 So. 664 (1922) ; State v. Roberts, 149 La.
657, 89 So. 888 (1921) ; State v. Carter, 106 La. 407, 409, 30 So. 895 (1901)
("It is well settled that the exception by which uncontradicted statements are
taken out of the rule against hearsay does not extend to cases where the accused
was under arrest when the statements were made.") ; State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann.
1397, 26 So. 390 (1899) ; State v. Estoup, 39 La. Ann. 906, 3 So. 124 (1887) ;
State v. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919, 921, 44 Am. Rep. 448, 449 (1882). In the
Diskin case, the defendant, after being arrested, was taken to the bedside of the
manhe allegedly shot and was there confronted by the statement: "[Y]ou hit'
me, and shot me for nothing, own up." The defendant remained silent. The court
held the statement inadmissible, saying: "Mere silence while a party is held in
custody under a criminal charge, affords no inference whatever of acquiescence in
1963] NOTES
Diskin,"' the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that an infer-
ence of acquiescence in the truth of accusations could not be
drawn from a defendant's silence after arrest. Subsequent
cases 12 have usually applied Diskin with little discussion. Re-
cently, however, State v. Ricks 8 raised some doubt as to the au-
thority of this line of cases. Of an objection made to testimony
of a deputy sheriff regarding identification of a gun, the court
stated: "The testimony was not hearsay for, as pointed out by
the judge, the entire incident took place in the presence of the
accused."'14
In the instant case, the court distinguished Ricks on the
ground that Ricks' arrest had not been urged as requiring exclu-
sion of the evidence of his silence. The prior jurisprudence was
reaffirmed by the declaration that a person under arrest has a
"right to remain silent" 15 with no duty to engage in argument
with his captors. This position was additionally supported by
the conclusion that silence of one under arrest cannot be con-
strued as conceding the truth of the statement made in his pres-
ence. This language indicates the decision hinges on the rele-
vance of the defendant's silence. If so, the court in effect holds
silence after arrest either completely irrelevant or only so slight-
statements made in his presence." Id. at 921, 44 Am. Rep. at 448. But see State
v. Bell, 129 La. 550, 56 So. 504 (1911).
The Louisiana Supreme Court rendered a somewhat anomalous decision in
the case of State v. Pace, 183 La. 838, 165 So. 6 (1935) ; the court held admis-
sible evidence of the silence after arrest of a defendant who failed to explain his
possession of recently stolen goods. The court relied on what is now LA. R.S.
15:432 (1950), which states: "[A] legal presumption relieves him in whose
favor it exists from the necessity of any proof; but may none the less be de-
stroyed by rebutting evidence; such as the presumption . . . that the person in
the unexplained possession of property recently stolen is the thief .... " The pre-
sumption that one in the unexplained possession of stolen goods is the thief had
been established by several cases prior to the statutory enactment. State v. Stick-
ney, 167 La. 1050, 120 So. 853 (1929) ; State v. Thompson, 137 La. 547, 68 So.
949 (1915) ; State v. Kelly, 50 La. Ann. 597, 23 So. 543 (1898) ; State v. Daly,
37 La. Ann. 576 (1885) ; State v. Kimble, 34 La. Ann. 392 (1882). But see State
v. Rock, 162 La. 299, 110 So. 482 (1926). However, these cases involved either
instructions to the jury as to the presumption of possession of stolen goods or
remarks made by the prosecutor to the jury concerning the presumption. None
involved the introduction of evidence of the accused's failure to explain possession
of goods recently stolen. If the statute was intended only as a codification of
prior jurisprudential law, which seems probable, the Pace decision may be open
to question. It would seem odd to admit testimony of the defendants' silence in
cases involving theft and exclude such testimony in all other cases.
11. 34 La. Ann. 919 (1882).
* 12. State v. Rini, 151 La. 163, 91 So. 664 (1922) ; State v. Roberts, 149 La.
467, 89 So. 888 (1921) ; State v. Estoup, 39 La. Ann. 906, 3 So. 124 (1887).
" 13. 242 La. 823, 138 So. 2d 589 (1962).
14. Id. at 831, 138 So. 2d at 592.
15. State v. Hayden, 243 La. 793, 799, 147 So. 2d 392, 394 (1962).
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ly relevant that its relevance 16 is outweighed by the danger that
the testimony would be misused by the jury.17 This determina-
tion is supported by the observation that men commonly believe
silence after arrest is good strategy. It is urged that courts
must require at least a high degree of relevance in such cases
because of the danger that a jury is likely to give primary
weight to the accusatory statements rather than to the resulting
ambiguous silence of the accused.
In addition, it seems unfair as a matter of policy to allow
the state to place an accused in a position in which he must
speak or suffer an adverse inference.' To allow such conduct
seems contrary to the "spirit if not the letter""' of the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. The court in the in-
stant case, in declaring that the defendant had a "right to re-
main silent, ' 20 seems to accede to this principle. Superadding
this constitutional consideration to the weakness of the infer-
ence of guilt to be drawn from the defendant's ambiguous si-
lence, the instant decision settles the water muddied by State v.
Ricks by a compelling reaffirmation of the principle that silence
to statements ordinarily calling for a response is not admissible
as an admission when the defendant is under arrest.2'
Herman Stewart, Jr.
INSURANCE - DIRECT ACTION - BREACH OF NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS As DEFENSE
Plaintiff, injured in a collision with an automobile insured
by defendant, recovered a default judgment against its operator
who was an insured under the omnibus clause of defendant's
policy.' Neither the owner- named insured- nor the defend-
16. For an analytical discussion of relevance see James, Relevancy, Probabil-
ity and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. RaV. 689 (1941).
17. See McCORMICK § 246, at 529.
18. See State v. Dills, 208 N.C. 313, 315, 180 S.E. 571, 572 (1935): "We
think in remaining silent the appellants acted within their legal rights, since no
man should be forced to incriminate himself or to make false statements to avoid
so doing."
19. Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1955).
20. 243 La. 793, 799, 147 So. 2d 392, 394 (1962).
21. In finding the trial court committed reversible error the court stated that
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses was violated. See
LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. This problem is outside of the scope of this Note. For a
general discussion of the right to confrontation see 5 WiMORaE § 1397.
1. "Insured" was defined in the policy as the named insured or anyone using
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